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**FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD**

This is the final issue of the Newsletter under the University of Florida editorial regin. It has been four years that our group has been charged with this task, first under the leadership of professor Michael Bernhard and then we just had to follow in his tracks and continue the job accordingly. This last issue features a symposium on democratic consolidation with contributors who highlight the latest we know about well-known factors

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**QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION**

**Bo Rothstein**, *University of Gothenburg*



**W**hat is a consolidated democracy and why is it sometimes difficult to achieve? One way to get a better understanding of this is to look at the opposite. What should count as a failed consolidation of a democratization process could be debated. Yet, it may be safe to argue that when political conflicts (a natural ingredient in any democracy) escalate into full blown civil wars, consolidation has failed. Two such cases will be discussed here, namely the outbreak of the civil wars in former Yugoslavia in 1991 and the Spanish Civil War in 1936.

The civil war in former Yugoslavia has been thoroughly analyzed from a great many perspectives and this is not the place to give a complete explanation of this tragic conflict. Instead, I want call attention to an often overlooked causal factor in analyses of conflicts like this, namely, what takes place at the “output side” of the political system. My starting point is an argument put forward by Michael Ignatieff, according to which in many respects this conflict was unlikely to happen. Firstly, he argues that the central government’s policy from the 1960s to replace the various national identities with a Yugoslav identity was not without success. Secondly, especially when it comes to Serbs and Croats, Ignatieff underlines their similarities in language and habits and states that “these people were neighbors, friends and spouses, not inhabitants of different planets.” There are several analyses of ethnically

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**THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION**

**José Antonio Cheibub**, *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*



**I**n this article, I discuss the role of political institutions in democratic consolidation. Regarding the forms of democratic government, I like to think that there are essentially two: those with a separation of powers and those that require assembly confidence. The first are typical presidential democracies, systems with constitutions that prescribe a fixed term in office for both a popularly and independently elected president and a congress. The second are the parliamentary (and semi-presidential) democracies, in which the government must be at least tolerated by a parliamentary majority in order to exist.

I will therefore focus on the effect of political institutions, whether parliamentary or presidential, on democratic consolidation. I start by briefly reviewing the earlier debate on the relationship between democratic form of government and consolidation. I then discuss what I see as two challenges we face today to advance the study of democratic consolidation: its proper definition and conceptualization, and to understand how the phenomena of democratic breakdown and consolidation changed since we first started to think about them. I conclude

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## Articles

**WHY DEMOCRACY SCHOLARS NEED TO LEARN MORE ABOUT STATE-BUILDING**Sheri Berman, *Barnard College*

After years of relative neglect, state building has come to be recognized by growing numbers of observers as an essential prerequisite for both political and economic development. Voices both inside the academy and out have proclaimed that without strong, effective states such goals as the establishment of order, the overcoming of socioeconomic inequality and communal divisions, the consolidation of democracy, and the emergence of well-functioning economies are impossible. Yet despite this growing recognition, our understanding of the process of state building has lagged far beyond our recognition of its importance. Many recent studies show why strong, effective states are good or explain how they differ from weak, predatory ones, but very few tell us *how* they can be acquired.<sup>1</sup>

This is partially because much of the historical literature on state-building focused on structural variables such as the development of trade<sup>2</sup> or capitalism,<sup>3</sup> geography, resource endowment<sup>4</sup> or, of course, war-making.<sup>5</sup> While valuable, such explanations leave several crucial questions unanswered, not least the “how” questions, and from a policy perspective such questions are crucial. Even if we accept

1. Francis Fukuyama, *State Building* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Ashraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart, *State Building* (N.Y.: Routledge, 2007); and idem, *Fixing Failed States* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2009).

2. Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

3. Ernst Gellner, *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Gianfranco Poggi, *The State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Verso, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980).

4. Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Thad Dunning, *Crude Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Robert Bates, *When Things Fell Apart* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

5. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42.

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**STATE FIREWALLS AND DEMOCRATIC DEEPENING**Agnes Cornell, *Aarhus University*Marcia Grimes, *University of Gothenburg*Victor Lapuente, *University of Gothenburg*

Many young democracies, such as those that came into being in the so called third wave, are today considered beyond risk of reversal to authoritarianism. As per the oft-cited criterion, democracy is, in these countries, “the only game in town.” Yet, as some observers note, one can still ask “what game is it, exactly?” Reflecting on such experiences as the Arab Spring, Ukraine’s Orange revolution, gridlock in the U.S. policy making, and the tendency toward over-indulgent short-term spending in Brazil and India, a recent issue of *The Economist* poses the question: *What’s gone wrong with democracy?* The piece notes that “...building the institutions needed to sustain democracy is very slow work indeed, and has dispelled the once-popular notion that democracy will blossom rapidly and spontaneously once the seed is planted.”<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, there are striking differences among “new” democracies regarding the type of political game being played and whether it suggests democratic deepening. As key elements of such deepening one could mention, for example, stable party systems and programmatic party platforms; deep-seeded respect for fundamental democratic tenets such as press freedom and political competition; horizontal accountability enhancing the congruence between the public will and government performance; universal endorsement of democratic means and channels for expressing preferences and grievances and, as a result, condemnation of violent or extremely disruptive political strategies. The question then becomes why these elements characterize some young democracies (such as Portugal and Spain in the late

1. Dan Slater, “Democratic Careening,” *World Politics* 65 (October 2013): 729-63, 730; “What’s Gone Wrong with Democracy,” *The Economist*, 1 March 2014, [www.economist.com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-most-successful-political-idea-20th-century-why-has-it-run-trouble-and-what-can-be-do](http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-most-successful-political-idea-20th-century-why-has-it-run-trouble-and-what-can-be-do).

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*Editors*


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## FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD, CONTINUED

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such as stateness, quality of government, and constitutionalism. We find the four essays terrific both as individual pieces and as a joint effort to provide a great overview of the state of the art in this area. Finally, the pieces are excellent examples of the high-quality work in our field and signifying for the willingness to contribute to this section's newsletter by our best scholars.

We have both enjoyed these last two years as Executive Editors tremendously. To everyone who consider these sorts of service to the profession, we can only encourage you to do so for the Comparative Democratization section. We are very proud of the series of symposia published in the Newsletter during our reign but should be given no, or very little credit for them! This

section hosts a wonderful cast of members who have been incredibly generous and collaborative making our job a very easy, and immensely rewarding task. It is a great section and on behalf of the collective membership we would like to extend the warmest and most grateful thank you to all the contributors!

We are also extremely grateful to our terrific team on the editorial committee, and to our assistant Adam Bilinski with funding provided by Professor Michael Bernhard from the Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Chair, by the Department of Political Science, and by the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at University of Florida. As always, our gratitude to Melissa Aten-Becnel for keeping us on track,

catching and correcting our mistakes, and for flawless editing is beyond words. It has been a great time.



Ironically, you will be left with one of us. The editorialship of the newsletter is now passed on to the V-Dem Institute in the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg. Staffan I. Lindberg will be joined by Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, and Kelly McMann to form the next committee of Executive Editors.

On behalf of the Editorial Committee,  
Benjamin Smith and Staffan I. Lindberg

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mixed villages that substantiate this. Thirdly, Ignatieff argues convincingly that the conflict cannot be traced back to some kind of “uniquely Balkan viciousness.” The type of “ethnic cleansing nationalism,” and murderous practices that had taken place during the Second World War in the Balkans, were according to him all imports from Western Europe and if Western Europe could erase these habits during the post-war era, the same should have been possible in former Yugoslavia. As Ignatieff states:

Therefore, we are making excuses for ourselves when we dismiss the Balkans as a sub-rational zone of intractable fanaticism. And we are ending the search for explanation just when it should begin if we assert that local ethnic hatreds were so rooted in history that they were bound to

explode into nationalist violence. On the contrary, these people had to be transformed from neighbors to enemies.<sup>1</sup>

My summary interpretation of what happened runs as follows. First, Slovenia decides to secede. This meets opposition in Belgrade, but since Slovenia only has a small population of Serbs, very little fighting takes place before Slovenia is de facto acknowledged as an independent state. When Croatia wants to go the same way, a major problem is that within its borders there is a fairly large Serbian minority (about 11 percent),

1. Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1994), 13, 15; Anthony Oberschall, “The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23 (November 2000): 982-1001; V. P. Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging*, 15f.

of which a considerable number live in a specific area – the Krajina province. This Serbian minority worried about what would happen to them in the new Croatian state, especially as the first elections resulted in a parliament where a nationalist Croat party led by Franjo Tudjman received the majority of the seats. However, in the beginning of this process, the Serb leaders within Croatia had pretty modest political demands and had no intention of taking the Serb minority out of the new Croat Republic.<sup>2</sup> In a speech in front of 10,000 Serbs delivered in June 1990, the then most important Serb leader in Croatia, Jovan Rašković, stated that:

2. Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

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The Serbs respect the Croatian people's right to their sovereign state, but they (the Serbs) demand in that state an equal position for the Serbian and other peoples. The Serbs do not want a second state in Croatia, but they demand autonomy... The Serbian people in Croatia should be allowed to speak their language, to write their scripts, to have their schools (cheers), to have their education programs, their publishing houses, and their newspapers.<sup>3</sup>

Rašković's claims were thus quite modest. What the leaders of the Serb minority asked for was something akin to the status of the Danish speaking minority in Germany and the German speaking minority in Italy. This indicates that for these "initial" Serbian minority leaders, the prospect of becoming a *permanent minority* in a new Croatian state was not seen as a problem that would delegitimize the new Croatian State in their opinion. However, the newly elected nationalist Tudjman regime did not accept this invitation for negotiations and compromise from the Serb leaders, still moderate at the time. Instead, it did five things that served to ignite the conflict and led to the outburst of violence in Krajina that then spread to other parts of former Yugoslavia.

First, in the constitution for the new Croatian state, the Tudjman government put in formulations that made it clear to the Serb community that from now on they would be second rate citizens in their country. The demand from the moderate Serb leaders for the Serbs in the new Croatian state to be defined as a constituent nation on an equal footing with the Croats was denied. The new constitution stated that the new state was for the Croatian

3. Cited in Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 95.

People and all other "nations" were reduced to national minorities. This was an important change, since in the constitution of the Yugoslav Federation, the Serbs in Croatia had been a "constituent nation of the Republic of Croatia." According to Silber and Little, this "was a hammer-blow to Rašković. It strengthened the hand of Serb nationalists much more radical than he: those who wanted territorial autonomy, and finally, secession from Croatia."<sup>4</sup>

Secondly, the Tudjman regime began to fire employees from various government jobs simply because they were Serbs – also in the Krajina province where ethnic Serbs dominated. As two observers write: "massive layoffs of Serbs took place almost immediately after Tudjman's election, striking Serbs in the police, army, the judiciary and the educational institutions." Thirdly, non-Croats were differentiated from Croats in yet another way:

An official document called a Domovnica (a form providing proof of Croatian origin) was instituted and became an instrument of differentiation between Croats and non-Croats when it came to jobs and privileges. Opening a private business, obtaining medical coverage and the right to retirement pay, getting a passport or a driver's license, even in some cases being qualified to make withdrawals from one's own savings accounts – all these things hinged on the possession of a Domovnica.<sup>5</sup>

4. James Gow, *The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 44; Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, 97.

5. Oberschall, *The Manipulation of Ethnicity*; Gow, *The Serbian Project*; Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*; Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), 107; Jasminka Udovički and Ivan Torov, "The Interlude: 1980:1990," in Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway, eds., *Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia*

Fourthly, there is evidence that from very early on (summer of 1989) police forces of the new Croatian regime failed to protect the security of Serb minorities "from vicious outbursts of anti-Serb terror in some mixed communities." It is noteworthy that this took place before the above statements were given by the moderate Serb leaders. Lastly, the Tudjman regime deliberately leaked information given by the moderate Serb leaders about their willingness to compromise and their negative opinion about the more radical fractions in the Serb community. This served to delegitimize the moderate Serb leaders in the eyes of their own community and served to strengthen the support of more militant Serb leaders in Krajina whose aim "was not to secure for the Serbs autonomy inside Croatia, but to take the Serbs, and the land on which they lived, out of Croatia altogether."<sup>6</sup>

In sum, these five conditions sent a loud and clear signal to the Serb minority that their possibilities to live securely and have their human rights respected in the new Croatian state were seriously in question. The police in the new state could not be trusted to protect them from attacks, they would encounter a "no Serbs need apply" policy when looking for government jobs, they would have difficulties in their contacts with the new state's civil service because they would not have the necessary documents, and they could count on meeting only ethnic Croats in their encounters with government authorities.

The events between Croats and Serbs in Croatia that followed led to violent conflict over the control of the police forces in Krajina and this made it (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1997), 94-95.

6. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 107; Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, 97.

possible for radical (secessionist) political entrepreneurs in the Serb community to rise to power, mobilize support for their cause in Belgrade, outmaneuver the more moderate Serb leaders and receive military support from the Serb-dominated National Yugoslav Army.<sup>7</sup> It is noteworthy that the Milosevic regime in Belgrade did not publicly recognize or support the self-declared “Serb Autonomous Province of Krajina” until later. It is also remarkable that the first two persons were killed in this conflict during a clash between the new Croatian police forces and the Krajina-Serb militia over the control of a local post office when the post-office workers belonging to the Serb minority refused to leave their jobs.<sup>8</sup>

This interpretation of the causal logic behind the outbreak of the civil war implies that it was not becoming a “permanent minority” that led the Serbs in Croatia to take to violence against the new Croatian state. Instead, it was the clear signals from the new government that they would be constantly discriminated at the “output” side of the political system that led to the failed consolidation of the new Croatian state.

The second example for why the output side is of great importance for the consolidation of fragile democracies is the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (SCW) in 1936. Recent research has

shown that many structural factors that have been put forward for explaining the outbreak of this war do not hold up for a closer empirical scrutiny. Spain was an economic laggard in Western Europe at the turn of the century, but from 1913 to 1929 the country experienced an important acceleration in growth. The SCW broke 15 years of uninterrupted improvements in both the levels of inequality and poverty, as stated in one recent analysis.<sup>9</sup>

Leaders of the Spanish Socialist Party had participated and held central positions in coalition governments during the early 1930s. In addition, as measured by the number of votes in national elections, the Fascist party in Spain was weaker in 1936 than the Fascist and Nazi parties in Sweden. Likewise, it was not the case that employers’ organizations were unwilling to meet many of the radical demands from the union movement. On the contrary, as late as of June 7, 1936, only one month before the outbreak of the war, 126 local and regional employers’ associations published a manifesto in which they showed their willingness to reach a broad labor-capital compromise. They were also ready to accept many points from the leftist Popular Front’s economic program, including some of the most controversial labor regulations. In a forthcoming article together with Victor Lapuente we explain the outbreak of the SCW by two hitherto neglected factors. First, the high level of political appointments in the civil service meant that the political conflict to a large extent became a conflict over jobs and thereby people’s livelihood. Secondly, the newly elected government in 1936, through many concrete and highly visible actions, made clear that their political opponents at all levels

of society would no longer have equal protection under the laws. Instead, the actions taken by the new government signaled that what would come would be illegal seizures of property, arbitrary police arrests of members of right-wing parties, impunity for criminal action for members of parties that formed the new majority, politicization of justice through new legislation and policies, and arbitrary political arrests and prosecution which would place the rightist parties outside the law. In addition, there were also actions signalling the political subversion of the security forces through reappointment of revolutionary police officers earlier prosecuted for violent and subversive actions, as well as confiscation of property (land) without compensation.<sup>10</sup> In short, we argue that the violations of the rule of law and civil liberties by the Popular Front government persuaded two key political groups, the middle-classes and the lower-and-middle-rank army officers, to move from being natural constituencies of the democratically elected centre-left parties in the government to become, in a few months, active supporters of Franco’s military uprising.

The conclusion from these two historical cases is that the degeneration of political legitimacy and absence of democratic consolidation are influenced more by factors located at the “output” side of the political system, than by factors at the “input” side. This is corroborated by several recent empirical studies that use cross-country survey data. They show quite a surprising result, namely, that perceptions of having democratic rights or of being adequately represented by

7. Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences* (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Oberschall, *Manipulation of Ethnicity*; Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*; Udovički and Torov, *The Interlude*. This interpretation of the history of the outbreak of the war should not be taken as an excuse for the many horrible war crimes that the Serbian military and para-military forces committed during the war that was to follow these events. However, what the Tudjman regime initially did was to give the nationalist hatemongers among the Serbs all the arguments that they needed.

8. Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, 137.

9. Victor Lapuente and Bo Rothstein, “Civil War Spain versus Swedish Harmony: The Quality of Government Factor,” *Comparative Political Studies* (forthcoming, 2015).

10. The previous section is based on a forthcoming article: Victor Lapuente and Bo Rothstein, “Civil War Spain Versus Swedish Harmony: The Quality of Government Factor,” *Comparative Political Studies* (2015). It should be added that this disregard of the rule of law and civil liberties was not confined to the Popular Front but was also the preferred choice by the previous center-right government.

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elected politicians does not seem to be the most important cause behind an individual's view that a political system is legitimate. Instead, "performance" or "output" measures, such as control of corruption, government effectiveness and the rule of law trump democratic rights in explaining political legitimacy. As stated by Bruce Gilley, "this clashes with standard liberal treatments of legitimacy that give overall priority to democratic rights". Using a different comparative survey data set, Dahlberg and Holmberg conclude in a similar vein that "government effectiveness is of greater importance for citizens' satisfaction with the way democracy functions, compared to factors such as ideological congruence on the input side. Impartial and effective bureaucracies matter more than representational devices."<sup>11</sup>

How can we make sense of that citizens' perceptions of rights on the input side of the political system are less important for political legitimacy and the consolidation of democracy than what takes place in the (mundane) implementation of public policies? One way to think about this is the following. In many electoral democracies, about a

11. Bruce Gilley, "The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries," *International Political Science Review* 27 (January 2006): 47-71, 58; Bruce Gilley, *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Torbjørn Gjefsen, "Sources of Regime Legitimacy. Quality of Government and Electoral Democracy" (Department of Political Science: University of Oslo, 2012); Stefan Dahlberg and Sören Holmberg, "Democracy and Bureaucracy: How Their Quality Matters for Popular Satisfaction," *West European Politics* (2013).

third of the electorate does not bother to vote. For some, the electoral system makes voting meaningless since many voters' preferred party or candidate does not stand a chance to win the election. Few citizens write op-ed articles, participate in demonstrations, sign petitions, or take other political actions. And perhaps, for many people who do not make use of their democratic rights on the input side of the political system, nothing of importance happens to them. Their life is likely to just go on as before. However, if your children will not get medical treatment because you cannot afford to pay the bribes demanded by the public health care workers; if the police will not protect you because you belong to an ethnic minority; if your property will be confiscated or you will lose your job because you belong to the "wrong" political party; if you will never get that building permit because you are not well-connected in the City Hall; or if the fire-brigade will not come to your part of the city, your situation affected in a very direct and concrete way.

Consider a situation when electricity and sanitation does not work in your neighborhood because the people who run these services got their jobs because they belong to the ruling party regardless of their level of competence. Or imagine that you do not get the right medical treatment for a deadly disease because the ever-so democratically elected President is surrounded by political cronies instead of competent non-partisan civil servants and experts.

Think if you were the victim of a natural disaster and help does not come because the National Rescue Agency is run by an incompetent person who got his job because he is a close friend to the President. Living in a state where the quality of government is low seriously affects peoples' well-being. For once, the large-n data gives us a clear result. While the correlations between most standard measures of human well-being and measures of a country's degree of democracy vary from non-existent to weak, they change from medium to strong if the measure of democracy is exchanged for measures of quality of government or "good governance." Thus, the findings from the survey studies reported above shows that when people all over the world make up their mind if their governments are legitimate, they give much greater weight to factors at the "output side" of the political system such as the rule of law and control of corruption than factors at the input side, that is, democratic rights. The implication is of this is that studies of democratization should pay more attention to factors related to state capacity and the quality of government.<sup>12</sup>

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12. Bo Rothstein, "What is the opposite to corruption," *Third World Quarterly* (forthcoming, 2014).

## CHEIBUB, CONTINUED

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with a few remarks on the kind of advice political scientists can give regarding the best constitutional form for the consolidation of democracy.

The impact of separation of powers or assembly confidence on democratic consolidation is no longer at the center of the democratization research agenda. Probably everyone is familiar with the argument, first developed by Juan Linz, according to which presidential institutions are likely to lead to crises that may ultimately cause the breakdown of democracies.<sup>1</sup> Although Linz offered more than one reason for the observed negative correlation between presidentialism and democracy, most important, in my view, was his argument about incentives for coalition formation. This argument was also the most fully developed in subsequent studies. His reasoning was as follows: presidential institutions fail to generate incentives for cooperation among individual politicians, among parties and between the legislative and executive powers. Because presidentialism provides no incentives for inter-branch cooperation, presidential democracies are characterized by frequent minority governments as well as conflict and deadlocks between the government and the legislature. Because presidential regimes lack a constitutional principle that can be invoked to resolve conflicts between the executive and the legislature, such as the vote of no confidence in parliamentary democracies, minority presidents and deadlock provide incentives for actors to search for extra-constitutional means of resolving differences. As a consequence, presidential democracies become more prone to instability and eventual death.

1. Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

Thus, according to Linz, presidential institutions are simply not conducive to governments capable of handling the explosive issues that are central to the new democracies in the developing world. These issues make governing difficult under any circumstances. Governing becomes almost impossible when the institutional setup is likely to generate governments with weak legislative support as well as parties and politicians whose dominant strategy is to act independently from one another. Given the lack of constitutional solutions to the crises that are almost inevitable in these countries, political actors have no choice but to appeal to those with the means to resolve their differences, even if at the price of democracy itself.

Here is not the place for rehashing the debate around these ideas. Let me simply say that Juan Linz's view of the negative impact of presidentialism on democratization was critically examined along two main lines. The first focused on the fact that parliamentary democracies were not altogether immune to the institutional crises that were supposed to characterize presidential ones. The second sought to show that the sequence of events that would lead to the breakdown of presidential democracies did not materialize with the frequency implied by the argument. Consequently, if the relationship between presidentialism and democratic breakdown is causal, the mechanism might not be the one postulated by Linz.

Of course, the discussion around the "perils of presidentialism" did not represent the last word in the debate about the impact of forms of government on democratic consolidation. This question still generates considerable interest, as it should. The correlation

between presidential institutions and democratic breakdown is still a reality and hence the intuitive arguments that have been made connecting the two still resonate. But to move forward it may be helpful to address some unresolved issues while recognizing how the political reality has changed since Linz's theory was formulated. Even though not a long time has passed since that moment, it is fair to say that the features of many of the cases we are confronted with today are quite different from the ones confronted by Linz.

But before we address these differences, let me say something about an important unresolved issue which affects the study of democratic consolidation: the definition and operationalization of the concept itself. We may know, or think we know, what a consolidated democracy is: it is the regime in which no relevant actor seeks to advance its political goals outside of the democratic institutional framework. We often say that a democracy is consolidated when its rules constitute the proverbial "only game in town." Yet, how can one tell that democracy is the only game in town? We act as if one simply knows it; as if we would be able to recognize a consolidated democracy when we saw one. Yet, is this satisfactory?

Some scholars use the survival of democracies, the number of years they have existed, to talk about their consolidation: we may know what affects the latter by studying the factors that make democracies last in time. In this view, the notion of consolidation is actually quite meaningless since no one has identified a benchmark that would separate consolidated from fragile

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democracies.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, this approach is often dismissed on the grounds that many democracies survive but do so in a state of permanent existential danger, which excludes them from the set of consolidated democracies. In other words, some think that survival is a bad indicator of consolidation because democracies may be “old” and yet not consolidated and, less intuitively, they can be “young” and entirely consolidated. The problem of differentiation between the two types is ignored, perhaps on the grounds that identification of truly consolidated democracies should be obvious to all.

But this, of course, is not the case. Perusing the different samples used in studies of democratic consolidation, one is stricken by the fact that the only truly consensual set of consolidated democracies consists of the rich, industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America, plus Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Democracies located in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa are assumed to be unconsolidated, fragile, fledgling, weak, transitional, or... They are anything but consolidated.

But when the regimes in Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Poland, India, Taiwan, South Korea, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Hungary, South Africa, and Kenya, to name only “a few,” will be considered reasonably consolidated democracies? True, these countries are faced with a variety of problems: in some crime rates are high, or corruption is rampant, or drug cartels challenge the central state. In others, governments adopt bad policies, they face frequent economic crises, inequality is high, or people organize, vote and live along ethnic lines. But

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2. This, of course, has not prevented scholars from using an arbitrary number of years for defining the sample of democracies they study and, implicitly, the ones that are consolidated.

are there forces in these countries that seek to advance their interests outside of democratic institutions? Probably not; and yet, those democracies are rarely even candidates for receiving the “badge of consolidation” conferred by the community of democratization scholars. This denial happens because of insufficient thinking about the meaning of democratic consolidation and lack of specification of conditions necessary to classify a democracy as consolidated. The aforementioned regimes are excluded from the set of consolidated democracies on the basis of criteria that have nothing to do with whether conflicts are processed within the rules of the game.

We need, thus, to think about the factors that contribute to democratic consolidation; we need to identify the set of democracies that, at any point in time, can be considered consolidated; we need to ask whether it is possible that consolidated democracies will become de-stabilized and then identify the conditions under which this happens; and finally, we need to identify the set of democracies that were once unconsolidated and then became immune to breakdown. Although these are obvious questions, I am not familiar with a single work that seeks to answer them directly at the basic, purely descriptive, level.<sup>3</sup>

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3. Although not descriptive in the sense I have in mind here, Svobik (2008) constitutes an exception. Thus, although the Svobik's paper is not about identifying concrete examples of consolidated and non-consolidated democracies, it does provide an empirical basis for distinguishing them. For Svobik the set of democracies is heterogeneous: it consists of regimes that survive because they face a low propensity to revert to authoritarianism, and of regimes that survive because they experience favorable conditions for survival. Although only survival of democracies is directly observable, it is possible to empirically distinguish the factors that matter for survival because they affect a democracy's propensity to breakdown (i.e. the scope of consolidation) from the factors that affect the actual timing of breakdown. This is, in my view, one of the most original contributions to the literature on democratic consolidation.

Today, many countries that are facing regime crises are presidential, which provides new support for the notion that the relationship between presidentialism and (failure of) democratic consolidation is causal. Examples such as Putin in Russia, Chavez in Venezuela and Yanukovich in Ukraine suggest that the fact that they were popularly elected for a fixed term in office may be related to the failure of democratic consolidation. Yet, simply invoking the usual “perils of presidentialism” argument to account for these cases will not do.

The original argument about the detrimental effects of presidentialism for democratic consolidation must be understood in the context of the virtual disappearance of democracy from Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1960 and 1975, almost every Latin American country experienced a democratic breakdown. Most of these democracies collapsed in the hands of the military, who inaugurated what O'Donnell called a new type of dictatorship – the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. As a matter of fact, during the Cold War, the vast majority of democracies collapsed as the result of a military coup, in a pattern that, at least superficially, corroborated Linz's view of a conflict between a fixed-term executive who did not have the support of a majority in congress.

Democratic breakdown happens nowadays in a very different way. Institutionalized militaries cannot be counted on to intervene into politics and take the reins of government from the hands of civilian politicians. If democracies fail to consolidate today, authoritarian regimes that replace them are more likely to be led by civilians, often the elected incumbent who, by a process of overt and covert manipulation, progressively removes the



conditions necessary for competitive elections to occur in the future. To use the terminology employed by Adam Przeworski and his co-authors,<sup>4</sup> transitions to authoritarianism after the Cold War are more likely to be “from above” and occur at the hands of the incumbent. They are likely to violate two of the three conditions which the above mentioned authors identified as necessary for a democracy to exist: “ex ante uncertainty,” namely, the requirement that electoral outcomes are not pre-determined, and “repeatability,” that is, the requirement that democratic incumbents hold competitive elections such as the ones that brought them into office.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, if it is true that there is a correlation between presidentialism and the recent failures of democratic consolidation (something that has not been established yet, as far as I know), and if it is true that these episodes of failure rarely if at all involve a military coup, we need to formulate new explanatory hypotheses. What is it about presidentialism that may lead to the entrenchment of incumbents in power? Conversely, which characteristics of parliamentary institutions might prevent such entrenchment?

One thing is sure, namely, that the Linzian approach to these questions will not take us far. The reason is that this approach is focused on the problem of legislative support for the executive, that is, on how parliamentarism virtually

assures that such support is present, and (multiparty) presidentialism virtually assures that it will be lacking. However, some of the contemporary cases suggest the opposite: democracy may be “saved” by the fact that the government does not have strong support in the legislature and it may be threatened in situations when the executive enjoys sufficient backing of the legislature to shut off the opposition.

Take a few recent examples. In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar was hampered in his authoritarian ambitions by repeated defections from his coalition, which eventually resulted in a vote of no-confidence in 1994 and the failure to form governments in 1998. This happened in spite of Mečiar’s control of a plurality of legislative seats. In Hungary, on the other hand, the overwhelming legislative support for Prime Minister Victor Orbán allowed him and his party to introduce changes that are widely seen as non-democratic. Similarly, as Sebastian Saiegh shows using an example of the fall of Bolivian president Sánchez Lozada in 2003,<sup>6</sup> the danger for democratic consolidation posed by an unconstitutional transfer of power should be attributed to situations which are in their nature opposite to deadlocks. As Saiegh suggests, in some circumstances the government may actually govern too much. Consequently, what threatens democracy is not so much that there is a deadlock between a constitutionally irremovable president and legislature but the fact that the two are aligned and can change the status quo in a direction that may suit their interests but not those of democracy. Deadlocks and minority governments may be precisely what save democracy from being suffocated by aspiring autocrats.

6. Sebastian Saiegh, *Ruling by Statute: How Uncertainty and Vote Buying Shape Lawmaking* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

If this conclusion reminds the reader of Madison and his view about separation of powers, it is *not* a mere coincidence.

Thus, the correlation between presidential institutions and (failure of) democratic consolidation in the contemporary world, if it exists at all, should not be considered intuitive and explainable in terms of hypotheses generated from a framework that sees the lack of legislative support for presidents as the crux of the problem. That framework was generated with a specific set of historical examples in mind, and it became popular in the context of the debt crisis in Latin America and the concerns about the ability of governments in the region to implement structural policies that were at the time considered necessary. While implementation of these policies required the preference alignment of the executive and the legislature, all countries operated under a constitution that provided no such guarantee. By contrast with presidentialism, assembly confidence was seeing as the institutional mechanism that assured support of legislative majority to the executive and parliamentarism as the form of government that would prevent the failure of the new democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe. We know where this story went: few democracies, parliamentary or presidential, failed in the way that was then expected. Perhaps this is the fact that requires explanation.

Yet, what kind of constitution is best suited to help consolidate democracy? Unfortunately, in my view, some scholars believe that there is a clear answer to this question and are not shy to advocate their views. For instance, in an opinion piece published in July 2013, Bruce Ackerman, a professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University, stated that the failure

4. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

5. The one that is not violated is “ex post certainty,” namely the assurance that whoever wins the election will take office. Note that the “alternation” rule introduced by Przeworski et al. to operationalize the three conditions of democracy speaks directly to the problems related to the measurement of incumbent-caused subversions of democracy.

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of the military rulers who had just taken power in Egypt to replace presidentialism with “a European-style parliamentary system,” “virtually guarantees a repetition of the tragic events of the past year.”<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, as he argues counterfactually, the adoption of a parliamentary constitution after Mubarak’s departure “could well have avoided the current upheaval and bloodshed in the first place.” The reason, according to him, is that “the presidency is a winner-take-all office,” which may be suitable for a country such as the United States, “where well-organized parties contend for the prize,” but “is a recipe for tyranny in places like Egypt, where Islamists have powerful organizational advantages in delivering the vote.” Although Ackerman stands out in the forcefulness and clarity with which he defends a constitutional overhaul in countries that adopt presidentialism, he certainly does not hold this opinion alone. Yet, we may ask: is this view warranted?

This kind of advice is based on generic and one-sided arguments, which are supported by scant historical and statistical evidence: isolated regime crises (Chile in 1973 is favorite, with

7. Bruce Ackerman, “To Save Egypt, Drop the Presidency,” *New York Times*, July 10, 2013.

Egypt beginning to trail behind) and references to the correlation between presidentialism and regime breakdown, as if correlation was evidence of causation. (But we know better than this!). Moreover, parliamentarism and presidentialism are very broad constitutional frameworks: as recent research has demonstrated, they can be configured in an infinite number of ways; they interact with other, small and large, institutional features of the political system; and, of course, they interact with non-institutional factors, unique to the country where they are being adopted. This last point is particularly relevant for Egypt. It is possible that Ackerman is right and a parliamentary constitution may do the trick in Egypt and allow for the peaceful processing of conflicts between Islamists and secularists. On the other hand, we have good reasons to believe that, given the nature of its military, the main problem in Egypt at this point is far from being institutional; perhaps given the presence of such an actor, any kind of constitutional arrangement would have failed. Thus, to reduce parliamentarism and presidentialism to one essential feature, to look at specific situations from the lens provided by this essential feature, and offer constitutional advice

on the basis of this exercise requires courage, the courage of fools who believe that they have successfully found the solution to the problem that has eluded everyone else.

I thus end with a note which suggests more humbleness than confidence in our ability to provide positive advice of the sort given by Ackerman. The vast majority of studies have failed to establish convincingly that there exists a causal relationship between the form of government and democracy. Consequently, unless in some specific case there is a broad consensus across the political spectrum about the need for change, it is not certain that the benefit of adopting a new type of constitution will outweigh the costs of implementing it.

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that broad structural forces like warfare, increasing trade, the emergence of capitalism, geography, or particular ideas<sup>6</sup> help explain *why* state building occurs, such explanations tell us little about *how* it actually comes about. How does political authority in fact get centralized? How can state builders manipulate environments in order to achieve their goals? Answering these questions requires a more direct focus on what state building in reality entails—that is, on the mechanisms and mechanics of state building. Structural accounts tend to downplay or even ignore this aspect of state building since the construction of states (or lack thereof) is seen as flowing inexorably from structural pressures or conditions.

Fortunately, if we look back carefully over the historical record we can at least begin to find answers to these questions. In comparison to the social scientific literature, the historical literature is less focused on macro-processes and structural factors and more concentrated on the actual mechanisms and technologies of state building. In particular, much historical research zeroes in on the challenge of centralizing authority in contexts where there are powerful opponents of it.

Up through the early modern period, Europe was divided into a large number of small political units with fairly porous, undefined borders. Although border regions were particularly unstable, a king's hold over the rest of his ostensible territories was often not much stronger. Most of the "countries" of the day were really loose collections of provinces, regions and people, effectively governed by local rulers, legal systems, and traditions. Where kings existed, they were often more titular

6. Kenneth Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People. Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 7ff; Daniel Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Philip Gorski, *The Disciplinary Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.)

than actual rulers. As is the case in many underdeveloped states today, they had little power outside of a "capital" city; most people had little contact with or even knowledge of the king and his court; and the king's authority was open to constant challenge. Indeed, the dominant authority in most peoples' lives during this time was local or religious. Direct responsibility for the provision of defense and welfare up through the early modern period lay for the most part not with kings, but rather with regional or provincial nobles (today we refer to analogous figures as "warlords" or perhaps tribal chiefs). In general, kings could not engage in warfare on their own, they needed the approval and support of local nobles who often provided the resources and men necessary for battle. Far from any central leader having a "monopoly over the use of violence," control over domestic violence in pre-modern Europe was dispersed and decentralized. Nobles retained their own private arsenals, armed forces and fortresses, and used them to defend their land and the people who lived under their rule. In many parts of Europe, therefore, nobles, rather than kings, were the key authority figures in the lives of most Europeans before the seventeenth century. In addition, the Catholic Church and ecclesiastical figures exerted immense social, cultural and political influence and carried out many of the functions we would normally associate with "states" (e.g. education, care for the poor, running hospitals, etc.). Thus, before the early modern period, authority in Europe was segmented and fragmented rather than centralized and most Europeans' identities remained primarily regional, local or religious rather than national. The geographical, ethnic or linguistic unity that we associate with modern states did not exist in the Europe of this time.<sup>7</sup>

7. Dan Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); J. S. Elliot, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," *Past and Present*, 137, November 1992: J.H. Elliot, *Europe Divided 1559-1598* (NY: Harper and Row, 1968); Janice Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns* (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

Beginning in about the seventeenth century, many European monarchs began to centralize authority and engage in what we now recognize as the beginnings of state building. Among the many theories as to why this process began at this time the most influential stresses the changing nature and frequency of warfare.<sup>8</sup> And it is certainly the case that the seventeenth century was a period of extraordinary conflict in Europe. However, it is important to note that not all of these conflicts were international.

This period was also marked by immense domestic upheaval—revolts, rebellions and uprisings were a characteristic feature of the age. It is worth noting that up through the 19th century, European militaries spent probably as much time fighting internal as external enemies. These revolts, rebellions, and uprisings, in turn, were themselves largely a consequence of the centralization drive. As monarchs and their agents began trying to centralize authority, challenging long-standing fragmented and segmented authority structures, local, regional and religious elites (as well as many of the ordinary people who had long lived under them) engaged in various forms of resistance. So frequent and severe were center-provincial-local confrontations, and so acute and disorienting was the larger debate about the nature and locus of authority occurring during this time that many historians view them as the cause of the "general crisis" that Europe experienced during the seventeenth century. As one well respected treatment of the period puts it, "behind the internal conflicts in the European countries in the middle of

1994); and Wolfgang Reinhard, ed., *Power Elites and State Building* (London: Clarendon Press, 1996).

8. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 42 and also Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1990). For an influential contemporary version of this argument see Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood and the African Crisis," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 24, 1, 1986

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the seventeenth century, we find the same factor: the growth of state power.”<sup>9</sup> In short, in Europe, as in much of the world today, turmoil and violence was the consequence of leaders’ attempts to centralize authority. Even where successful, European state-building was marred by constant conflicts and setbacks, and required endless deal-making and bargaining. This is because even when faced with a desperate need to raise revenue to fight wars—a classic Tillyesque situation—most European monarchs were initially unable to eliminate those opposed to the centralization of authority. What the historical literature reveals, in other words, is that when faced with opposition to centralization, many monarchs (and in particular those that turned out to be successful, and many were not) turned to a variety of co-optation strategies in order to get the job done.

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9. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley Smith, *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 47; Perez Zagorian, *Rebels and Rulers, 1500–1660* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); see also Theodore K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 33.

It is impossible to go into details here, but learning more about the different strategies pursued by early modern European rulers and why some were successful while others were not, would go a long way towards helping us build a better understanding of how a central characteristic or pre-requisite of state building—the centralization of authority—actually got and gets done.

In pre-modern Europe as in many parts of the world today, state building could only really get underway once the interests of elites had been transformed: they needed to begin seeing their own fortunes as being linked to, or at least not mortally threatened by, centralized authority. In order to effect this transformation European monarchs relied on the use of material incentives to try to gain at least the acquiescence of their adversaries. These material incentives and strategies varied greatly, were more or less successful, and had diverse political consequences. Learning more about them would fill out our picture of state building as well as other aspects of political development given that the form of state

formation critically influences the type of political regime that subsequently develops. The most obvious historical example of this process is the French case. In this instance, understanding of the nature of the ancien régime French state is a necessary prerequisite for understanding of both the French revolution and the political trajectory that followed. It is similarly impossible to understand English, Prussian, Spanish, Polish or indeed any country’s political development without examining the type of state these countries experienced, and the process in which it was built. In short, if we really want to understand why not just democracy, but also economic development, social stability and other critical tasks are achieved in some places but not others, we need to spend more time studying how the states tasked with carrying out these goals develop in the first place.

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twentieth century or Chile and Estonia in the early twenty-first century) while remain elusive in the others (e.g. many post-Soviet republics or current Venezuela)?

The areas most often scrutinized in efforts to understand these syndromes are those directly involved in process of preference aggregation and policy-making, i.e. political parties, the electoral system, legislatures or the executive.<sup>2</sup> Democracy and political contestation operate in a larger institutional space, however, and attributes of this landscape may have far-reaching implications for the strategies, objectives, and logics of various sets of political actors, which in turn may alter the nature of the political contest. In this essay we present the underpinnings of a research agenda that examines how the relationship between input (policy making) and output (policy implementing) institutions in the political system may affect numerous aspects of the democratic process. We therefore advocate broadening the scope of analysis, and in particular directing attention at the structure of the relationship *between* the political and the administrative spheres of the state. This institutional interface may either be highly porous or alternatively characterized by safeguards and restrictions aimed at maintaining a clear division of roles and jurisdictions.

The virtuousness of a firewall separating politicians and bureaucrats has been noted by public administration scholars, from classical authors such as Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber to contemporary researchers,<sup>3</sup> but has been largely

overlooked in the democratization literature. We contend that the division between the political and administrative sectors of the government, functioning as a firewall around the processes of political contestation may, somewhat paradoxically, *strengthen* the congruence between popular will and policy outcomes. The existence of those institutional firewalls also lengthen the time horizons of policymaking and tips the calculus of political action away from certain strategies considered less consistent with well-functioning democracy, such as wooing voters with promises of private goods.

Institutions set the normative frameworks for actors' behavior, inform what is allowed and appropriate, but also constitute the incentive structure for choices in a broad range of strategies not specifically stipulated in rules and procedures. In a state, what matters are not only structures of each institution per se, but also their interrelations since an institution (e.g. the legislature or executive) can be a principal and an agent at the same time. In textbook definitions of democracy, however, institutions of preference aggregation and policy formation are construed as principals while bureaucratic institutions act as agents. Concerning the relationship between political and administrative spheres of the state, a balance must be struck between control and stimulus, but they should also be appropriately separated in order to allow for effective oversight and corrective action. This trade-off accounts for the vast across-state and within-state variation in the degree to which political institutions control administrative institutions. With too little control, the state ceases to be a democracy, transforming into a "technocracy." Yet, too much control creates incentives for politicians, bureaucrats and citizens to engage in behaviors which in the aggregate inhibit a deepening of democracy.

### Consequences of Excessive Political Control over the Bureaucracy

Politicians, if elected through free and fair elections, provide the best approximation of the aggregate of citizens' preferences, and must in any democracy exert control over the means, ways and aims of the bureaucracy. All states, in order to control bureaucracies, use a mix of various instruments, ranging from organizational (such as budget allocation and objective-based governing) to individual ones (such as civil service codes and personnel policies). In fact, one of the means used to ensure an obedient civil service corps is to control staff policy through political appointments.<sup>4</sup> However, as stated above, the problem is that this kind of control over bureaucracy might be too excessive, and in this case it blurs the distinction between political and administrative spheres of government.

We argue that the firewall between the political and bureaucratic spheres of the state should be an important constituent part of the government since it would affect incentives of various groups of agents: politicians, bureaucrats, but also civil society actors. The discussion below explores how a politicized bureaucracy affects incentives of each of these categories of actors.

#### *Politicians – Incumbents and Opposition.*

To start with, when politicians have excessive control over the bureaucracy, and in particular over careers of individual bureaucrats, incumbent politicians have much greater opportunities to engage in discretionary allocation of public goods and services to reward party supporters or build support among potential voters. A politically controlled bureaucracy, in short, enables parties to carry out clientelistic and particularistic politics, and to reward politically loyal groups or individuals. This control of the bureaucracy thus allows

2. Scott Mainwaring, and Timothy Scully (eds.). *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. (Stanford, Calif. Stanford University Press, 1995).

3. Weber, M. [1921]. *Economy and Society*, Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (eds) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Wilson, W. 1887. "Study of Administration." *Political Science Quarterly* 2(2): 197-222.; D. E. Lewis. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

4. Barbara Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

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the incumbent to use state resources to strengthen the ruling party and increase its chances of reelection. This happens when, let's say, political appointees are used for campaigning, or personnel in state-owned media broadcasts the incumbent's political messages. Personnel employed in the "misiones" (a type of state-funded social programs) in Venezuela participated, for instance, in political campaigning for Hugo Chavez.<sup>5</sup>

This is not to say that political appointments under all circumstances result in increased selective apportionment of public goods and resources, but merely that the opportunities for such apportionment increase with the scope of politicization of the bureaucracy. Once a ruling party opts for short term clientelistic strategies, it may create further incentives for other politicians and parties to follow suit if they have the ability to do so. However, these actions contribute to an uneven electoral playing field because opposition politicians obviously do not have the same opportunity to use state resources as the government. Autonomous bureaucracies, on the other hand, prevent politicians from policy micro-management and thus make implementation of particularistic goals more difficult. In settings where bureaucracies are autonomous, politicians may therefore be more inclined to carry out more programmatic policies.

In any democracy the opposition will find it hard to put its constituents' preferences on the policy agenda. However, in situations where the flow of government resources is politicized, the position of opposition supporters is even worse as they suffer not only from smaller influence over policy decisions, but also from poorer access to

5. Agnes Cornell and Victor Lapuente, "Meritocratic Administration and Democratic Stability," *Democratization* (forthcoming). For description of "misiones" in Venezuela, see Scott Mainwaring, "From Representative Democracy to Participatory Competitive Authoritarianism: Hugo Chávez and Venezuelan Politics," *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (December 2012): 955-967.

goods and services. Consequently, electoral losers are left to wait until it becomes their "time to eat", or otherwise they may resort to more unconventional means of exerting pressure on incumbents, such as instigating supporters to engage in disruptive protests.<sup>6</sup>

In the system of politicized bureaucracy the logic of politics tips in favor of clientelistic exchanges at the expense of more universal policies, and there is a reason to believe that in such a system, the logic of accountability will be quite similar. Incumbent politicians would, in a politicized setting, have weak incentives to hold bureaucratic agencies to account as a whole so that the latter would be pressured to improve the quality of services available to all citizens. Instead, politicians would hold *individual bureaucrats* accountable in order to assure that their clients receive promised goods and services. A degree of separation is required for accountability to function optimally, and this separation erodes in a highly politicized administration.

Moreover, the ability of the legislature to hold the executive accountable may suffer if the power of the two branches of government becomes substantially imbalanced. Extensive control of the bureaucracy may strengthen the executive power precisely because it is primarily the executive that has the right to appoint public officials. In this situation the legislature may become relatively toothless despite formal powers of recall, impeachment or questioning.

*Bureaucrats.* If bureaucrats are politically recruited, loyalty to the incumbent and the ruling party rather than to the agency

6. E.g. Martin Shefter, "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy," *Politics & Society* 7 (December 1977): 403-451; Michela Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle Blower* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009); Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes, "Disruptive Protests and Bureaucratic Structures in Latin America and the Caribbean" Quality of Government Institute Working Paper Series 2014:4.

may be the most rational strategy in terms of career advancement.<sup>7</sup> In other words, bureaucrats will have incentives to carry out the will and whim of the appointing politicians, even when such actions might not concur with the spirit of the law or the stated aims and performance objectives of the agency in which they are employed. Such effects would of course be more intense in settings where politicians not only have the power to appoint, but also to dismiss. In such arrangements, bureaucrats' obedience is synonymous with continued employment.

Moreover, strong political control of the bureaucracy curtails its ability to inject expert knowledge and evaluative feedback into the policy formation process. Organizational volatility or threats of dismissal may affect bureaucrats' time horizons negatively, with detrimental consequences for professional development, long-term planning and overall performance. In sum, political appointments resulting in high turnover rates creates a situation in which the bureaucracy is composed to a larger extent of inexperienced officials and the scope of invaluable organizational and policy knowledge fails to accumulate.<sup>8</sup> And needless to say, when offices of audit and oversight are politicized, horizontal accountability is eroded. Politicization of institutions responsible for drawing electoral districts may distort electoral accountability as well.

*Civil Society.* In a system of politicized bureaucracy, civil society organizations

7. Nolan McCarty, "The Appointments Dilemma," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (July 2004): 413-428; David E. Lewis, *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Daniel Gingerich, *Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America: Stealing for the Team* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

8. Agnes Cornell, "Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Governance Programs," *Governance* 2014; 27 (2): 191-214 (available online at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/gove.12037>).

may also face a different type of incentive structure than in a polity with a more autonomous administrative branch. Both individual citizens and associations alike may have incentives to develop clientelistic bonds of reciprocity with individual politicians or political parties. This happens because in such a system clientelistic exchanges turn out to be the most effective means of provision of goods and services to civil society members. Whether community-based organizations or labor unions, citizens associations may adapt to the logic of political machines, promising to deliver votes in order to secure the desired regulations or club goods. Here too, a constituent part of the larger accountability chain breaks down. Civil society no longer serves to strengthen horizontal networks in a way that allows citizens to mobilize, monitor and hold government accountable. Rather, it is more likely to be polarized and focused on members' specific needs. Research on Brazil shows, for example, how neighborhood organizations use clientelistic tactics to secure street lighting and how clientelism even in some cases permeates participatory budgeting.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, citizens' associations lacking connections to incumbents may choose, as the most effective recourse, to secure goods and services through various forms of disruptive actions. Disruptions such as roadblocks, destruction of public buildings and looting transform the problems of a specific group into the problem of the general public, including constituents of ruling parties. Paradoxically, a better organized citizenry, in such a system, contributes to destabilization of the political system to a larger extent. Hence, when bureaucracy is autonomous, a strong civil society holds politicians accountable and improves the quality of democracy. But when bureaucracy is politicized,

9. Robert Gay, *Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: A Tale of Two Favelas* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994); Brian Wampler, "When does participatory democracy deepen the quality of democracy? Lessons from Brazil." *Comparative Politics* 2008; 41(1): 61-81.

presence of a strong civil society increases the risk of recurrent protests and disruptive actions. This may be one of the reasons of high incidence of protests in some Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, which also is among the ones with the highest degree of politicized bureaucracy in the region.<sup>10</sup>

### **A porous or robust firewall: Moving beyond state capacity**

Though narrower, our answer to the question posed by the *The Economist* is similar to the journal's own answer: "The most successful new democracies have all worked in large part because they avoided the temptation of majoritarianism—the notion that winning an election entitles the majority to do whatever it pleases." The discussion above describes ways in which an insufficiently robust firewall between the political and administrative spheres may affect the nature of the political game. If the spheres are separated, political contestation is constrained to the electoral and policy-making arenas, and majoritarianism and extreme polarization of the political game is curtailed. Obviously, democracies must have electoral winners and losers. Yet, in democracies with porous firewalls between politics and administration, losing elections entails also forfeited access to state resources.

A robust firewall is not a sufficient condition for democratic deepening, but it could tip the balance in its favor. This would be especially likely if it was combined with other factors that have been more extensively studied, such as a strong civil society, economic growth or

10. Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes, "Disruptive Protests and Bureaucratic Structures in Latin America and the Caribbean" *Quality of Government Institute Working Paper Series* 2014:4.; Marcia Grimes, "The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link Between Civil Society and Good Government" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 48 (December 2013): 380-402; Agnes Cornell, "Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Governance Programs" *Governance* 2014; 27 (2): 191-214 (available online at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/gove.12037>).

the emergence of a large middle class. In contrast, lack of separation between politics and administration exacerbates the negative effects of other factors on democratic stability. In particular, economic crises may affect system performance differently depending on the nature of the relationship between the political and bureaucratic spheres of the state. When a crisis negatively affects state revenues, the incumbent may have difficulty upholding the clientelistic linkages with its support base, which may even prompt electoral winners to engage in disruptive protest.<sup>11</sup>

In our argument, we share a concern with a number of other authors for how the structure and capacity of the state affects the functioning of democracy.<sup>12</sup> We agree that clientelism, poor service provision, failure in representative channels, and overall deficient aggregation of citizens' preferences and implementation of policy weaken support for democracy and diminish the willingness to abide by the rules of the game. The insight we seek to add is that a politically controlled civil service *in particular* changes the logic of politics and political action, transforming politics from a battle of ideas and interests, into a battle over state resources.

We seek to develop this line of inquiry by advancing a theoretical account regarding the institutional crux of the problems in many democratic states. We argue that while an autonomous bureaucracy may not suffice to correct all democratic dysfunctions, a

11. See for example Jan Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For an example from Argentina on how a crisis undermines ruling party's clientelistic linkages, see Javier Auyero and Timothy Patrick Moran, "The Dynamics of Collective Violence: Dissecting Food Riots in Contemporary Argentina," *Social Forces* 85 (March 2007): 1341-67.

12. Fabiana Machado, Carlos Scartascini, and Mariano Tommasi, "Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55 (June 2011): 340-65; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

### *Cornell, Grimes, and Lapuente*

highly politicized bureaucracy is a sufficient condition for instability of the political system as a whole. The incentive structure resulting from a system that affords politicians extensive power to intervene in the workings of the bureaucracy is one of the factors lowering the quality of democracy. To the extent that the incentive structure described here captures the dynamics actually at work, political control of the bureaucracy may in fact undermine representation, give clientelistic parties an advantage over more programmatic parties, weaken accountability mechanisms, and result in poor quality of service provision. An overly politicized bureaucracy is, in other words, the institutional source of these ills.

The theoretical account presented here suggests a number of testable claims that warrant empirical scrutiny as better measures of bureaucratic autonomy become available, in part through our own research efforts. Do the various groups of actors discussed here regard the political game in a way that is consistent with the expectations outlined in this article? For example, do civil society associations see clientelistic strategies as more viable than other forms of civic engagement in countries with a politicized bureaucracy? Does their behavior concur with the predictions we suggest? What are the various mechanisms of political control of the bureaucracy? Finally, one might ask at what point more precisely does political control of the bureaucracy, which is a

necessary feature of democracy, become too restrictive so that it starts to undermine democratic performance? Efforts to conceptualize the relationship between input and output institutions in both theory and measurement of state institutions will advance the study of democratic deepening, as well as state performance, state capacity and institutional sequencing, and in the longer term help to inform efforts to further democratic development.

*Agnes Cornell, is a postdoc, in the department of political science at Aarhus University. Marcia Grimes is an associate professor, of political science at the University of Gothenburg. Victor Lapuente is an associate professor of political science at University of Gothenburg.*



## NEWS FROM MEMBERS

**Leslie E. Anderson**, University of Florida Research Foundation Professor of Political Science, published “Democratization and Oppositional Consciousness in Argentina” in the April 2014 *Polity*. The article concludes that Argentine groups engaged in collective action do not fully comprehend the oppressive systemic environment in which they operate, limiting their effectiveness.

Anderson was also awarded the “Doctoral Mentoring Award,” the University of Florida’s highest university-wide honor for doctoral dissertation mentors. She also served as the graduate coordinator in the department of political science for the past academic year.

**Diego Avaria** was awarded the first prize at the Contest on Chilean Foreign Policy, Security, Defense, and Integration organized by the Chilean Career Diplomats Association, National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies, and Alberto Hurtado University. Avaria was awarded the prize for his paper entitled “La administración Reagan y el plebiscito en Chile: La política de presión (1987-1989)” (“The Reagan Administration and the Plebiscite in Chile: The Politics of Pressure (1987-1989)”). The paper will be published in a book.

**Michael Bernhard**, Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Chair in Political Science, University of Florida, published an article with Ruchan Kaya entitled “Are Elections Mechanisms of Authoritarian Stability or Democratization? Evidence from Postcommunist Eurasia” in the September 2013 *Perspectives on Politics*. He also published “From Formlessness to Structure? The Institutionalization of Competitive Party Systems in Africa,” coauthored with Keith Weghorst, in the June 2014 *Comparative Political Studies*.

Bernhard and **Jan Kubik**, professor and chair of the political science department,

Rutgers University, edited *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*, which will be published by Oxford University Press in July 2014. The volume helps readers to understand the utility of historical memory as an important and understudied aspect of democratization and examines patterns of extrication from state socialism, patterns of ethnic and class conflict, the strategies of communist successor parties, and the cultural traditions of a given country that influence the way official collective memory is constructed.

**Kamran Bokhari**, PhD researcher and visiting lecturer of politics and international relations, University of Westminster, published *Political Islam in the Age of Democratization* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) with Farid Senzai. The book provides “a theoretical framework, classification of Islamists, and rich historical context” to explore modern political Islam’s relationship with democracy. The book was listed as one of the ten most significant books in 2013 by the Foreign Policy Association in 2013 and has been reviewed by the London School of Economics.

**Catherine Boone**, professor of government and international development, London School of Economics, published *Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The book analyzes patterns of land ownership and access to natural resources shape dynamics including “land-related competition and conflict, territorial conflict, patron-client relations, electoral cleavage and mobilization, ethnic politics, rural rebellion, and the localization and ‘nationalization’ of political competition.”

**Archie Brown**, Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, published *The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in*

*the Modern Age* (Basic Books, 2014). The book examines the past hundred years in political leadership, arguing that history’s truly transformational leaders have not always employed the forceful leadership style often assumed to be most desirable. Brown also published a review article entitled “Alfred Stepan and the Study of Comparative Politics” in the April 2014 *Government and Opposition*.

**Lenka Bustikova**, assistant professor of politics and global studies, Arizona State University, published “Revenge of the Radical Right” in the February 2014 *Comparative Political Studies*. By using a party-election dataset, the article claims that the success of right-wing political parties is a result of the backlash to the politics of minority accommodation.

**Melani Cammett**, associate professor of political science, Brown University, published *Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon* (Cornell University Press, 2014). The book examines “how and why sectarian groups deploy welfare benefits for such varied goals as attracting marginal voters, solidifying intraconfessional support, mobilizing mass support, and supporting militia fighters.”

Cammett also co-edited *The Politics of Non-State Social Welfare* (Cornell University Press, 2014) with Lauren Morris MacLean; published “Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?” with Pauline Jones Luong in the May/June 2014 *Annual Review of Political Science* and “Governance and Health in the Arab World” in the August 2013 issue of *The Lancet*; and contributed the chapter entitled “Epilogue: A Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings” in *A Political Economy of the Middle East* (Westview Press, August 2013) with Ishac Diwan.

**Bonnie N. Field**, associate professor of

## News from Members

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global studies, Bentley University, published “Minority Parliamentary Government and Multilevel Politics: Spain’s System of Mutual Back Scratching,” in the April 2014 *Comparative Politics*. The article analyzes how multilevel territorial politics impact the performance of minority parliamentary governments, suggesting that particular regional governing dynamics can assure or complicate a minority government’s ability to attain the parliamentary support necessary to govern.

**Jonathan Fox** is now a professor of development studies at American University’s School of International Service.

**Carlos Gervasoni**, professor of political science and international affairs, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and Alberto Porto edited *Consecuencias Económicas y Políticas del Federalismo Fiscal Argentino (Consequences of Argentina’s Fiscal Federalism)* (Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 2013). The book analyzes the effects of federal transfers and other aspects of Argentina’s intergovernmental revenue-sharing system on a number of political and economic outcomes: presidential survival, gubernatorial incumbent advantage, rates of economic growth of provinces, the territorial distribution of income, the compensation of adverse macroeconomic shocks, the geographic distribution of manufacturing production, and the structure of provincial public spending.

**J. Paul Goode**, associate professor of political science and director of graduate studies, University of Oklahoma, published “Legitimacy and Identity in Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections” in *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* (Volume 3, no. 1). Goode has also been awarded a Fulbright Scholar Research Grant to conduct fieldwork in Russia.

**Henry E. Hale**, associate professor of

political science and international affairs, the George Washington University, and Timothy J. Colton published “Putin’s Uneasy Return and Hybrid Regime Stability: The 2012 Russian Election Studies Survey” in the March/April 2014 *Problems of Post-Communism*. The authors argue that despite the fact that Putin’s regime retains broad and deep connections with the electorate, ominous signs of erosion portend bigger problems despite the coercive force and other resources at the authorities’ disposal.

**Manal A. Jamal** was recently promoted to associate professor of political science (with tenure) at James Madison University. She also published “Western Donor Assistance & Gender Empowerment in the Palestinian Territories and Beyond” which appeared in the winter issue of *International Feminist Journal of Politics*.

“The Most Important Topic Political Scientists Are Not Studying: Adapting to Climate Change,” by **Debra Javeline**, associate professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, is available as a FirstView Article in *Perspectives on Politics*. The piece reviews the literature on climate change, highlighting questions that might benefit from political science research.

**Maiah Jaskoski**, assistant professor of national security affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, received an award for “Best Published Article on Defense and Security Affairs in 2013” from the Defense, Public Security, and Democracy section of the Latin American Studies Association. The award was given for the publication of “Private Financing of the Military: A Local Political Economy Approach” in the June 2013 *Studies in Comparative International Development*. The article identifies two paths to local military-client relations: weak state capacity or demand from powerful industries or subnational governments.

**Mohammad Ali Kadivar**, PhD candidate

in sociology, University of North Carolina, published “Alliances and Perception Profiles in the Iranian Reform Movement, 1997–2005” in the November 2013 *American Sociological Review*.

**Karrie J. Koesel**, assistant professor of political science, University of Oregon, published *Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences* (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The book explores how religious and political authorities in authoritarian settings manage their relationship—often with unexpected levels of mutually beneficial cooperation.

**Maria Koinova**, associate professor of politics and international studies, Warwick University, published “Why Do Conflict-Generated Diasporas Pursue Sovereignty-Based Claims through State-Based or Transnational Channels? Armenian, Albanian, and Palestinian Diasporas Compared” in the March 2014 *European Journal of International Relations*. The article asks why diaspora entrepreneurs in liberal states pursue sovereignty goals through the institutional channels of their host-states, or through transnational channels.

Koinova also published *Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States: Varieties of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Kosovo* (University of Pennsylvania Press, June 2013).

**Yoonkyung Lee**, associate professor of sociology, SUNY-Binghamton, published “Political Parties and Social Movements: Patterns of Democratic Representation in Korea and Taiwan,” in the June 2014 *Asian Survey*. Lee also published “Digital Opportunities and Democratic Participation in Tech-Savvy Korea” in the Winter 2013 *Korea Observer* and contributed a chapter entitled “Global Ascendance, Domestic Fracture: Korea’s Economic Transformation since 1997” in *New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan* (Stanford University

Press, 2014), edited by **Larry Diamond**, senior fellow, Stanford University, and Gi-Wook Shin.

**Peter Lorentzen**, assistant professor of political science, University of California, Berkeley, published “China’s Strategic Censorship” in the April 2014 *American Journal of Political Science*. The article examines how China has managed to permit more independent journalism without engendering a broader liberalization, and shows how the spread of the Internet can induce authoritarian regimes to tighten controls on traditional media.

Lorentzen also published “Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of China’s Industrial Giants,” with Pierre Landry and John Yasuda, in the January 2014 *Journal of Politics*. This article demonstrates that authoritarian regimes may face political barriers to implementing quasi-democratic reforms even when these are intended to preserve authoritarian rule rather than undermine it.

**Ellen Lust**, associate professor of political science, Yale University, and **Miriam Wakim**, research associate, Council on Middle East Studies, received a five-year grant from the Moulay Hicham Foundation to found the Program on Governance and Local Development at Yale University. The Program will “[foster] innovative research that breaks new ground in the understandings of governance and development issues focused on the Middle East.” Its inaugural conference, “Mapping Local Governance,” was held on May 1-2, 2014.

**Scott Mainwaring**, Eugene and Helen Conley Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, and **Aníbal Pérez-Liñán**, associate professor of political science, University of Pittsburgh, published *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

The book presents a new theory of the emergence and collapse of political regimes, focusing on the preferences of powerful actors and the impact of transnational influences to explain regime outcomes. The authors employ this framework to account for the emergence, survival, and fall of democracies and dictatorships in Latin America since 1900.

**Julie Fisher Melton**, board member, World Affairs Council of Maine, will be presenting a paper entitled “Loyal Opposition: NGOs and Political Parties” in July at the International Society for Third Sector Research conference in Muenster, Germany. The paper will compare her research on civil society as a loyal opposition with recent work on the future of political parties suggesting that they are experiencing a long-term decline throughout the world.

**Pippa Norris**, McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Harvard University, edited *Advancing Electoral Integrity* (Oxford University Press, 2014) with Richard W. Frank and Ferran Martinez i Coma. The book collects essays by international experts comparing and applying innovative, alternative methods of election evaluation.

Norris was also awarded the 2014 Karl Deutsch Award, given to prominent scholars engaged in cross-disciplinary research.

**Marc F. Plattner**, co-editor, *Journal of Democracy*, and vice president for research and conferences, National Endowment for Democracy, delivered the Alexis de Tocqueville Annual Lecture at the Catholic University of Portugal in February 2014. The lecture’s theme explored “The Era of Democratic Transitions.”

**Rachel Beatty Riedl**, assistant professor of political science, Northwestern University, published *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*

(Cambridge University Press, 2014). The book asks, “Why have seemingly similar African countries developed very different forms of democratic party systems?”, positing that during democratic transitions, the preceding regime uses its reservoir of local support to shape political institutions to their interests.

**Sharon Werning Rivera**, associate professor of government, Hamilton College, and David W. Rivera, scholar-in-residence, Hamilton College, published “Is Russia a Militocracy? Conceptual Issues and Extant Findings Regarding Elite Militarization,” in *Post-Soviet Affairs* (Vol. 30, no. 1). The authors investigate the widespread assumption that since former KGB lieutenant-colonel Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency, large numbers of *siloviki*, individuals with experience in the military and security agencies, have been recruited into positions of power and authority throughout the polity and economy. This framework – which they call the “militocracy paradigm” – has provided the most widespread explanation of the de-democratization that has been a hallmark of the Putin years.

Ms. Rivera also recently completed her residence at the Linguistics University of Nizhny Novgorod as a Fulbright U.S. Scholar to the Russian Federation.

**Kim Lane Scheppele**, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Sociology and International Affairs and director, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University, has published a number of items on Hungary’s elections and constitutional reform. The first, a five-part series entitled “Hungary: an Election in Question,” ran in the *New York Times* in February 2014. A follow-up post in April 2014 ran under the title “Legal but Not Fair (Hungary).” A later piece, in *The Nation*, “Hungary and the End of Politics,” criticized Prime Minister Victor Orbán’s consolidation of power. Scheppele also published “Making

## News from Members

Infringement Procedures More Effective: A Comment on Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12 (8 April 2014) (Grand Chamber)" in *Eutopia Law* in April 2014.

**Benjamin Smith**, associate professor of political science, University of Florida, **Dan Slater**, associate professor of political science, University of Chicago, and Gautam Nair published "Economic Origins of Democratic Breakdown? The Redistributive Model and the Post-Colonial State" in the June 2014 *Perspectives on Politics*.

**Etel Solingen** was named the Thomas T. and Elizabeth C. Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California Irvine. Solingen also served as the president of the International Studies Association from 2012 to 2013 under the theme "The Politics of Transnational and Regional Diffusion," highlighting a large number of panels on comparative democratization, the Arab Spring, and related topics. Her forthcoming book on *Comparative Regionalism: Economics and Security* will be published by Routledge.

**Netina Tan**, assistant professor of political science, McMaster University, published "The 2011 General and Presidential Elections in Singapore," available online as part of the September 2014 *Electoral Studies*. She also published "Ethnic Quotas and Unintended Effects on Women's Political Representation in Singapore" in the January 2014 *Electoral Studies* and "Manipulating Electoral Laws in Singapore" in the December 2013 *Electoral Studies*, and contributed a chapter entitled "Democratization and Embracing Uncertainty in Post-2011 Singapore" in *Democracy in Eastern Asia: Issues, Problems, and Challenges in a Region of Diversity* (Routledge, October 2013), edited by

Edmund Fung and Steven Drakely.

**Maya Tudor**, university lecturer in government and public policy, Oxford University, published "Renewed Hope in Pakistan" in the April 2014 *Journal of Democracy*. The article argues that the smooth transfer of power following the May 2013 elections is a milestone in the consolidation of Pakistan's democracy.

**Milada Anna Vachudova**, associate professor of political science, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, published "EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On," in the January 2014 *Journal of Common Market Studies*. The article argues that "the enlargement process continues to have a 'democratizing effect,' as Western Balkans candidates and proto-candidates respond to the incentives of EU membership."

Vachudova also published "The Thieves of Bosnia," in the February 2014 *Foreign Affairs*. In May 2014, she is teaching in the Interdisciplinary Joint Master's Programme in South-Eastern European Studies in the University of Belgrade's Faculty of Politics.

**Michael Wahman**, Swedish research council fellow, London School of Economics, edited a special issue of *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* on "Scandinavian Research on Authoritarian Resilience 115, no. 4. The special issue included contributions (in Swedish and English) by **Staffan I. Lindberg**, professor of political science, University of Gothenburg; **Jan Teorell**, professor of political science, Lund University; Sten Widmalm; Merete Bech Seeberg; Jørgen Møller and **Svend-Erik Skaaning**, professor of political science and government, Aarhus University;

Lise Rakner and Lars Svåsand; Christian Göbel; Emil Uddhammar; and Michael Wahman. The issue was launched at a public symposium at Lund University on December 10, with the Swedish Minister of Foreign Aid as the key-note speaker.

Wahman also published "Democratization and Electoral Turnovers in Sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond" in *Democratization* 21, no. 2 and "Electoral Coordination in Anglophone Africa" in *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 52, no. 2.

**Kurt Weyland**, Lozano Long Professor of Latin American Politics, University of Texas at Austin, published *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848* (Cambridge University Press, April 2014). The book explores how changes in political organization between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries simultaneously slowed the spread of democratic revolution while making revolutionary movements more successful.

**Matthew S. Winters**, assistant professor of political science, University of Illinois, published "Public Service Provision under Conditions of Insufficient Citizen Demand: Insights from the Urban Sanitation Sector in Indonesia" in the August 2014 *World Development*. The article is coauthored with Abdul Gaffar Karim and Berly Martawardaya. With **Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro**, Stanley J. Bernstein Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brown University, Winters published "Partisan Protesters and Nonpartisan Protests in Brazil" in the April 2014 *Journal of Politics in Latin America*.

*Journal of Democracy*

## NEW RESEARCH

The April 2014 (Vol. 25, no. 2) *Journal of Democracy* features clusters of articles on Zimbabwe and South Asia, as well as individual case studies on Mandela's legacy, ethnic power sharing, and democratic parliamentary monarchies.

"Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems" by Donald L. Horowitz

*In severely divided societies, ethnic cleavages tend to produce ethnic parties and ethnic voting. Power-sharing institutions can ameliorate this problem, but attempts to establish such institutions, whether based on a consociational or a centripetal model, face formidable difficulties.*

"Mandela's Legacy at Home and Abroad" by Princeton N. Lyman

*Nelson Mandela, who died in late 2013, fought for freedom for all the people of South Africa and masterfully guided his country's transition to a nonracial democracy. His record on foreign policy is more ambiguous, but also instructive.*

"Democratic Parliamentary Monarchies" by Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Juli F. Minoves

*How do democracies emerge from monarchies? In an essay that eminent political scientist Juan J. Linz was working on when he passed away in October 2013, he and his coauthors draw lessons from the European experience about whether and how Arab monarchies might aid or resist democratic development.*

**A New Twilight in Zimbabwe?**

I. "The Perils of Power Sharing" by Adrienne LeBas

*After four years of sharing power with the opposition, Zimbabwe's longtime president Robert Mugabe and his party claimed a huge victory in the 2013 elections. What accounts for the opposition's stunning electoral decline?*

II. "The Military vs. Democracy" by Charles

Mangongera

*By militarizing key state institutions and using violence against the opposition, Zimbabwe's military elites have hindered the country's transition to democracy. In return, they have been richly rewarded. Can the military's tentacles be untangled from Zimbabwean politics?*

**The Freedom House Survey for 2013**

"The Democratic Leadership Gap" by Arch Puddington

*Civil-liberties scores have notably declined over the past several years, while political-rights scores have slightly improved—perhaps because modern authoritarians have begun to adopt subtler means of repression. Overall, however, freedom experienced a global decline for the eighth straight year in 2013.*

**Shifting Tides in South Asia**

I. "India and Its Neighbors" by Sumit Ganguly

*Home to about a quarter of the world's people, South Asia presents a murky and not very encouraging picture when it comes to democracy.*

II. "Renewed Hope in Pakistan?" by Maya Tudor

*Long prone to coups, Pakistan now for the first time has seen a freely elected government duly serve out its full term and peacefully hand the reins of power to another.*

III. "Bangladesh's Failed Election" by Ali Riaz

*After two decades of elections that produced a number of alternations in power, an impasse over "caretaker government" crippled the 2014 contest and has made single-party rule all too real a prospect.*

IV. "Reform and Resistance in Nepal" by Mahendra Lawoti

*After a decade of upheavals, Nepal elected in November 2013 its Second Constituent Assembly, but it is still unclear whether elites*

*will accept reforms that empower wider*

*sections of society.*

V. "Sri Lanka's Postwar Descent" by Jason G. Stone

*With the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in a 26-year civil war, Sri Lanka had a chance for genuine reconciliation, but that chance is being squandered by the government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa.*

VI. "Bhutan's Deferential Democracy" by S.D. Muni

*An opposition victory in this Himalayan kingdom's second elections in 2013 showed that surprises are possible even in a democratic transition that has been guided from above by the monarchy.*

VII. "Tumult in the Maldives" by Fathima Musthaq

*After a brief era of political opening, the authoritarian old guard has ridden a dubiously conducted presidential election back into power.*

**Democratization**

The Volume 21, no. 4 (2014) issue of *Democratization* includes articles on democracy promotion in Ghana, Turkish civil society, deviant democracy, political parties in Tanzania, regime transitions in Italy and Russia, and the role of civil society in oil-reliant countries.

"Promoting Democracy in Ghana: Exploring the Democratic Roles of Donor-Sponsored Non-Governmental Organizations" by Jelmer Kamstra and Luuk Knippenberg

"Turkish Civil Society Divided by the Headscarf Ban" by Sema Akboga

"Mapping Deviant Democracy" by Michael Seeberg

"Party Matters: The Institutional Origins of Competitive Hegemony in Tanzania" by Yonatan L. Morse

"Exploring the Link between Patronage

## New Research

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and Party Institutionalization: An Historical-Institutional Analysis of the Italian Transition” by Fabrizio Di Mascio

“The Limited Agency and Life-Cycles of Personalized Dominant Parties in the Post-Soviet Space: The Cases of United Russia and Nur Otan” by Rico Isaacs and Sarah Whitmore

“Can Oil-Reliant Countries Democratize? An Assessment of the Role of Civil Society in Algeria” by Charity Butcher

“Citizenship, Social Rights and Judicial Review in Regime Transition: The Case of Russia” by Andrea Chandler

The Volume 21, no. 3 (2014) issue of *Democratization* includes articles on framing the past in post-conflict societies, semi-presidentialism in Lusophone countries, Muslim support for European integration, civil society and democratization, and presidential politics in new democracies.

“Policing Politics: Framing the Past in Post-Conflict Divided Societies” by Cillian McGrattan

“Conditional Effect of Economic Development on Democracy: The Relevance of the State” by Min Tang and Dwayne Woods

“Semi-Presidentialism in Lusophone Countries: Diffusion and Operation” by Octavio Amorim Neto and Marina Costa Lobo

“Muslims’ Support for European Integration: The Role of Organizational Capacities” by Arolda Elbasani and Beken Saatçioğlu

“Civil Society and Democratization: A Counter-Case from India” by Sarbeswar Sahoo

“Consociational Settlements in Deeply

Divided Societies: The Liberal-Corporate Distinction” by Allison McCulloch

“Impeachment and Presidential Politics in New Democracies” by Young Hun Kim

“Support for Democracy and Early Socialization in a Non-Democratic Country: Does the Regime Matter?” by Malina Voicu and Edurne Bartolome Peral

The Volume 21, no. 2 (2014) issue of *Democratization* includes articles on electoral turnovers in sub-Saharan Africa, democratic consolidation in Timor-Leste, student activism in Iran, and institutional design in post-conflict societies.

“How Well Ordinary Citizens Understand Democracy: The Case of the South Korean Electorate” by Youngho Cho

“Democratization and Electoral Turnovers in Sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond” by Michael Wahman

“Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics: A Country’s ‘Centre’ and Democratization” by Murat Somer

“Semi-Presidentialism, Moderating Power and Inclusive Governance: The Experience of Timor-Leste in Consolidating Democracy” by Rui Graça Feijó

“Iranian Student Activism between Authoritarianism and Democratization: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation between the Office for the Strengthening of Unity and the Regime” by Paola Rivetti and Francesco Cavatorta

“The Transnational Protection Regime and Democratic Breakthrough in Taiwan and South Korea” by Su-Mei Ooi

“Pre-Designing Democracy: Institutional Design of Interim Governments and Democratization in 15 Post-Conflict Societies” by Julia Strasheim and Hanne

Fjelde

“Is Democracy the Only Game in Town? Tension between Immigrants’ Democratic Desires and Authoritarian Imprints” by Antoine Bilodeau

The Volume 21, no. 1 (2014) issue of *Democratization* includes articles on social tolerance and democracy, democratization in Singapore, coalitional politics, electoral fraud, regime type and good governance, and executive format.

“Pluralistic Conditioning: Social Tolerance and Effective Democracy” by Kris Dunn and Shane P. Singh

“The Bonsai under the Banyan Tree: Democracy and Democratisation in Singapore” by Michael D. Barr

“Is Successful Democracy Promotion Possible? The Conceptual Problem” by Hans Agné

“Rethinking the ‘Presidentialism Debate’: Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective” by Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, and Timothy Power

“The Role of Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity in Explaining Different Types of Electoral Fraud” by Jessica Fortin-Rittberger

“Regime Type and Good Governance in Low and High Income States: What Is the Empirical Link? By Daniel Stockemer

“Party ‘Capacity’ in New Democracies: How Executive Format Affects the Recruitment of Presidents and Prime Ministers” by David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart

“Economic Foundations of Subnational Authoritarianism: Insights and Evidence

from Qualitative and Quantitative

Research” by John T. Sidel

### SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

This section features selected articles on democracy that appeared in journals received by the NED’s Democracy Resource Center, February 1– May 15, 2014.

#### *African Affairs*, Vol. 113, no. 451, April 2014

“Policing, State Power, and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy: A New Perspective” by Jonny Steinberg

“South Sudan: Civil War, Predation and the Making of a Military Aristocracy” by Clemence Pinaud

“The Risks of African Military Capacity Building: Lessons from Rwanda” by Danielle Beswick

“Navigating the Middle Ground: The Political Values of Ordinary Hutu in Post-Genocide Rwanda” by Anuradha Chakravarty

“New Media and the Developmental State in Ethiopia” by Iginio Gagliardone

#### *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 108, no. 1, February 2014

“Transforming Power Relationships: Leadership, Risk, and Hope” by James H. Read and Ian Shapiro

“States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions” by Allison Carnegie

“How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education” by Christopher Blattman,

Alexandra C. Hartman, and Robert A.

Blair

“Opening the Black Box of Social Capital Formation” by Patricio Valdivieso and Benjamin Villena-Roldan

“The Impact of Recentralization on Public Services: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the Abolition of Elected Councils in Vietnam” by Edmund J. Malesky, Cuong Viet Nguyen, and Anh Tran

#### *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 107, no. 4, November 2013

“Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics: The Influence of Elite Cues, Female Advancement, and Individual Characteristics” by Jana Morgan and Melissa Buice

“Social Networks and the Mass Media” by David A. Siegel

“Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South Asia” by Saumitra Jha

“Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace” by Michael R. Tomz and Jessica L. P. Weeks

#### *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 47, no. 1, March 2014

“Not Much Happened: The Impact of Gender Quotas in Poland” by Frances Millard

“Coercive Capacity and the Durability of the Chinese Communist State” by Yuhua Wang

“Dear Mr. President’: The Blogosphere as Arena for Communication between People and Power” by Natalia Moen-Larsen

“Transformation of the Welfare State in Lithuania: Towards Globalization and Europeanization” by Jolanta Aidukaite

“Emancipative Values in Georgia: An

Individual Level Analysis” by Natia Mestvirishvili and Maia Mestvirishvili

“US Democracy Assistance Programs in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution” by Povilas Žielys and Rūta Rudinskaitė

#### *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 47, no. 7, June 2014

“Opinion Climates and Immigrant Political Action: A Cross-National Study of 25 European Democracies” by Aida Just and Christopher J. Anderson

“The Forgotten Side of Partisanship: Negative Party Identification in Four Anglo-American Democracies” by Mike Medeiros and Alain Noël

#### *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 47, no. 6, May 2014

“Who’s in Charge? How Voters Attribute Responsibility in the European Union” by Sara B. Hobolt and James Tilley

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#### *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 47, no. 5, April 2014

“A Discreet Critique of Discrete Regime Type Data” by Matthew C. Wilson

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“Election Boycotts and Hybrid Regime

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Survival” by Ian O. Smith

“Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems” by Valeria Palanza and Gisela Sin

*Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 47, no. 4, March 2014

“When the Stakes Are High: Party Competition and Negative Campaigning” by Annemarie S. Walter, Wouter van der Brug, and Philip van Praag

“Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts” by Emiliano Grossman and Cornelia Woll

*Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 47, no. 3, March 2014

“State Capacity and the Environmental Investment Gap in Authoritarian States” by Hugh Ward, Xun Cao, and Bumba Mukherjee

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“Government Responses to Fiscal Austerity: The Effect of Institutional Fragmentation and Partisanship” by Carsten Jensen and Peter B. Mortensen

“How Context Matters? Mobilization, Political Opportunity Structures, and Nonelectoral Political Participation in Old and New Democracies” by Kateřina Vráblíková

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“The Politics of Financial Booms and Crises: Evidence From Latin America” by Daniela Campello

*Comparative Politics*, Vol. 46, no. 3, April

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“When Politicians Cede Control of Resources: Land, Chiefs, and Coalition Building in Africa” by Kate Baldwin

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“The Impact of Participatory Democracy: Evidence from Brazil’s National Public Policy Conferences” by Thamy Pogrebinski and David Samuels

“The Dark Side of Power-Sharing: Middle Managers and Civil War Recurrence” by Sarah Zukerman Daly

*Comparative Politics*, Vol. 46, no. 2, January 2014

“International Pressure, Domestic Politics, and the Dynamics of Religious Freedom: Evidence from Turkey” by Ramazan Kiliç

“Better Safe than Sorry: How Property Rights and Veto Players Jointly Affect Economic Growth” by Mogens K. Justesen

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“When Winning Seats is Not Everything: Tactical Seat-Loss during Democratization” by Nina S. Barzachka

“Political Trust *in extremis*” by Antonis A. Ellinas and Iasonas Lamprianou

*Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 22, no. 2, Spring

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“Media Democratization in Russia and Eurasia” by Peter Rollberg

“Russia’s Nongovernmental Media Under Assault” by Maria Lipman

“Russia and the New Authoritarians” by Jonathan Becker

“Media in Post-Soviet Belarus: Between Democratization and Reinforcing Authoritarianism” by Oleg Manaev

“Ukraine’s Media in the Context of Global Cultural Convergence” by Marta Dyczok

“Networked Apathy: Georgian Party Politics and the Role of Social Media” by Kornely Kakachia, Tamara Pataraiia, and Michael Cecire

“Glasnost 2.0” by Sarah Oates

“Coercion or Conformism? Censorship and Self-Censorship among Russian Media Personalities and Reporters in the 2010s” by Elisabeth Schimpfoss and Ilya Yablokov

*Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 22, no. 1, Winter 2014

“Two Can Play at that Game: Social Media Opportunities in Azerbaijan for Government and Opposition” by Katy Pearce

“No Laughing Matter: Humor as a Means of Dissent in the Digital Era: The Case of Authoritarian Azerbaijan” by Katy Pearce and Adnan Hajizada

“Elections, Appointments, and Human Capital: The Case of Russian Mayors” by Noah Buckley, Guzel Garifullina, Ora John Reuter and Alexandra Shubenkova

“The Impact of Semi-Presidentialism on



- Democratic Consolidation in Poland and Ukraine” by Oleksii Sydorhuk
- East European Politics*, Vol. 30, no. 2, May 2014
- “The 2014 Sochi Olympic Mega-Project and Russia’s Political Economy” by Robert W. Orttung and Sufian Zhemukhov
- “Exit, Choice and Legacy: Explaining the Patterns of Party Politics in Post-Communist Slovakia” by Tim Haughton
- “Uploading as Political Strategy: the European Parliament and the Hungarian Media Law Debate” by Agnes Batory
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- “Co-optation in the Process of Dominant Party System Building: the Case of Russia” by Grigorii V. Golosov
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- “The Ethno-Violence Nexus: Measuring Ethnic Group Identity in Chechnya” by Craig Douglas Albert
- East European Politics & Societies*, Vol. 28, no. 2, May 2014
- “What the Party Wanted to Know: Citizen Complaints as a ‘Barometer of Public Opinion’ in Communist Bulgaria” by Martin K. Dimitrov
- “Democracy between Ethnos and Demos: Territorial Identification and Political Support in the Baltic States” by Kjetil Duvold and Sten Berglund
- “For Rule of Law, Political Plurality, and a Just Society: Use of the Legislative Veto by President Václav Havel” by Vlastimil Havlík, Milan Hrubeš, and Marek Pecina
- Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93, no. 3, May/June 2014
- “What Iran Really Wants” by Mohammad Javad Zarif
- “Russia’s Latest Land Grab” by Jeffrey Mankoff
- “The Rise of Rwanda’s Women” by Swanee Hunt
- International Political Science Review*, Vol. 35, no. 2, March 2014
- “The Impact of Diamonds on Economic Growth, Adverse Regime Change, and Democratic State-Building in Africa” by Rollin F. Tusalem and Minion K.C. Morrison
- “Explaining Variation of Executive Instability in Presidential Regimes: Presidential Interruptions in Latin America” by Leiv Marsteintredet
- “How Does Political Trust Affect Social Trust? An Analysis of Survey Data from Rural China Using an Instrumental Variables Approach” by Ran Tao, Dali L. Yang, Ming Li, and Xi Lu
- International Political Science Review*, Vol. 35, no. 1, January 2014
- “Electoral Quotas and Political Representation: Comparative Perspectives” by Mona Lena Krook and Pär Zetterberg
- “Ethnic Quotas and Ethnic Representation Worldwide” by Karen Bird
- “Ethnic Quotas and Unintended Effects on Women’s Political Representation in Singapore” by Netina Tan
- “Quotas and Intersectionality: Ethnicity and Gender in Candidate Selection” by Karen Celis, Silvia Erzeel, Liza Mügge, and Alyt Damstra
- “Playing with Different Cards: Party Politics, Gender Quotas and Women’s Empowerment” by Tània Verge and Maria de la Fuente
- “Who Benefits from Gender Quotas? Assessing the Impact of Election Procedure Reform on Members’ of Parliament Attributes in Uganda” by Cecilia Josefsson
- Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 52, no. 2, June 2014
- “Trade Networks in West Africa: A Social Network Approach” by Olivier J. Walther
- “Can Someone Get Me Outta This

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Middle Class Zone?! Pressures on Middle Class Kikuyu in Kenya's 2013 Election" by Dominic Burbidge

"The Politics of Civil Service Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo" by Stylianos Moshonas

*Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 52, no. 1, March 2014

"Ultrationalism, Democracy and the Law: Insights from Côte d'Ivoire" by Giulia Piccolino

"The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military coups d'état in Africa (1952–2012): An Empirical Assessment" by Issaka K. Souaré

*Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 56, no. 1, Spring 2014

"A Two-Level Theory of Presidential Instability" by Aníbal Pérez-Liñán

"Democratization Through Contention? Regional and Local Governance Conflict in Peru" by Gary Bland and Luis A. Chirinos

"Supporting the Iron Fist: Crime News, Public Opinion, and Authoritarian Crime Control in Guatemala" by Krystin Krause

"Democracy and Social Welfare in Uruguay and Paraguay" by Davide Grassi

"The Organization of the Executive Branch in Latin America: What We Know and What We Need to Know" by Alejandro Bonvecchi and Carlos Scartascini

"Explaining the Rise of Ethnic Politics in Contemporary Latin America" by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

*Middle East Journal*, Vol. 68, no 1, Winter 2014

"State of Barbary' (Take Two): From the Arab Spring to the Return of Violence in Syria" by Philippe Droz-Vincent

"Economic Reform, Social Welfare, and

Instability: Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, 1983–2004" by Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan

*Middle East Journal*, Vol. 67, no 4, Autumn 2013

"Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt's Military Elite, 1981–2011" by Hicham Bou Nassif

"Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia" by Michele Penner Angrist

"Egypt: Diplomacy and the Politics of Change" by Robert Bowker

*Middle East Policy*, Vol. 21, no. 1, Spring 2014

"Troubled Political Transitions: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya" by Ann M. Lesch

"Islam, Democracy and Islamism After the Counterrevolution in Egypt" by Muqtedar Khan

"Turkey after the Arab Spring: Policy Dilemmas" by Yaşar Yakış

"The EU and Lebanon in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings" by Tamirace Fakhoury

"Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring" by Curtis R. Ryan

*Middle East Policy*, Vol. 20, no. 4, Winter 2013

"Coping with Kaleidoscopic Change in the Middle East" by Chas W. Freeman, Jr.

"Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy" by Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

"Bahrain: A Very Complicated Little Island" by Ronald E. Neumann

"Regional Upheaval: The Stakes for the GCC" by Amal A. Kandeel

"The 'Arab Spring': Socioeconomic

Aspects" by Onn Winckler

"The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: Implications for Egypt" by Elizabeth Iskander Monier and Annette Ranko

"Ahmadinejad's Legacy" by Jahangir Amuzegar

"Iran's Foreign Policy: A Shifting Strategic Landscape" by Mahmood Monshipouri and Manochehr Dorraj

*Party Politics*, Vol. 20, no. 3, May 2014

"Choosing the Enemy: Attack Behaviour in a Multiparty System" by Annemarie S. Walter

"The Block-Weighted Cleavage Salience Index" by Hila Federer-Shtayer and Michael F. Meffert

"Putting the Damper On: Do Parties De-emphasize Issues in Response to Internal Divisions among Their Supporters?" by Marc van de Wardt

"Parties, Cleavages and Issue Evolution: The Case of the Religious–Secular Cleavage in Chile" by Christopher Raymond and Brian M. Barros Felth

"Political Parties and Rallies in Latin America" by Mariela Szwarcberg

*Party Politics*, Vol. 20, no. 2, March 2014

"Party Adaptation and Change and the Crisis of Democracy" by Luciano Bardi, Stefano Bartolini, and Alexander Trechsel

"Power and the (II) Legitimacy of Political Parties: An Unavoidable Paradox of Contemporary Democracy?" by Piero Ignazi

"No Man Can Serve Two Masters: Party Politicians, Party Members, Citizens and Principal–Agent Models of Democracy" by Richard S. Katz

"The Discreet Charm of Political Parties"

by Zsolt Enyedi

“The Decline of Membership-Based Politics” by Ingrid van Biezen and Thomas Poguntke

“Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change” by Cas Mudde

“Allure or Alternative? Direct Democracy and Party Identification” by Matthias Fatke

**Party Politics, Vol. 20, no. 1, January 2014**

“Towards a Classification of the World’s Democratic Party Systems, Step 2: Placing the Units into Categories” by Grigorii V Golosov

“Party Systems and Cleavage Structures Revisited: A Sociological Explanation of Party System Institutionalization in East Central Europe” by Fernando Casal Bértoa

“Two Routes to Personalized Politics: Centralized and Decentralized Personalization” by Meital Balmas, Gideon Rahat, Tamir Sheafer, and Shaul R. Shenhav

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“Socio-Economic Voter Profile and Motives for Islamist Support in Morocco” by Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner

**World Politics, Vol. 66, no. 2, April 2014**

“How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid

Distribution” by Ryan S. Jablonski

**SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY**

**ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES**

*American Constitutional Law. Volume 1, The Structure of Government.* 9th edition. By Ralph A. Rossum and G. Alan Tarr. Westview Press, 2014. 678 pp.

*American Constitutional Law. Volume 2, The Bill of Rights and Subsequent Amendments.* 9th edition. By Ralph A. Rossum and G. Alan Tarr. Westview Press, 2014. 927 pp.

*The American Political Landscape.* By Byron E. Shafer and Richard H. Spady. Harvard University Press, 2014. 342 pp.

*Campaigns and Elections American Style.* 4th edition. Edited by James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson. Westview Press, 2014. 340 pp.

*Democracy as a Way of Life in America: A History.* By Richard Schneirov and Gaston A. Fernandez. Routledge, 2014. 222 pp.

*Democracy Without Justice in Spain: The Politics of Forgetting.* By Omar G. Encarnación. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. 249 pp.

*Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama.* By Stephen Sestanovich. Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 402 pp.

*Propaganda and American Democracy.* Edited by Nancy Snow. Louisiana State University Press, 2014. 220 pp.

*Rescaling the European State: The Making of Territory and the Rise of the Meso.* By Michael Keating. Oxford University Press, 2013. 233 pp.

*Through a Screen Darkly: Popular Culture,*

*Public Diplomacy, and America’s Image Abroad.* By Martha Bayles. Yale University Press, 2014. 326 pp.

*Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What Future for Europe.* By Anthony Giddens. Polity, 2014. 242 pp.

**AFRICA**

*Economic and Political Reform in Africa: Anthropological Perspectives.* By Peter D. Little. Indiana University Press, 2014. 240 pp.

*Identity, Citizenship, and Political Conflict in Africa.* By Edmond J. Keller. Indiana University Press, 2014. 208 pp.

*Law and the Public Sphere in Africa: La Palabre and Other Writings.* By Jean Godefroy Bidima. Translated and edited by Laura Hengehold. Indiana University Press, 2014. 197 pp.

**ASIA**

*Battles Half Won: India’s Improbable Democracy.* By Ashutosh Varshney. Penguin, 2013. 415 pp.

*Battling Corruption: Has NREGA Reached India’s Rural Poor.* By Shylashri Shankar and Raghav Gaiha. Oxford University Press, 2013. 272 pp.

*Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape.* By Noah Coburn and Anna Larson. Columbia University Press, 2014. 284 pp.

*Getting It Right in Afghanistan.* Edited by Scott Smith, Moeed Yusuf, and Colin Cookman. USIP Press, 2013. 333 pp.

*India: Political Ideas and the Making of a Democratic Discourse.* By Gurpreet Mahajan. Zed Books, 2013. 181 pp.

*Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation*

## New Research

*and the Gift of Chinese Development.* By Emily T. Yeh. Cornell University Press, 2013. 324 pp.

*The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World.* By T.V. Paul. Oxford University Press, 2014. 272 pp.

### EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

*The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century.* By Angela E. Stent. Princeton University Press, 2014. 355 pp.

*Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States.* By Jakob Tolstrup. Lynne Rienner, 2014. 295 pp.

*The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War.* By James Graham Wilson. Cornell University, 2014. 264 pp.

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*Cities from Scratch: Poverty and Informality in Urban Latin America.* Edited by Brodwyn Fischer, Bryan McCann, and Javier Auyero. Duke University Press, 2014. 293 pp.

*Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall.* By Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Li-nán. Cambridge University Press, 2013. 353 pp.

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*Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy.* Edited by Diego Abente Brun and Larry Diamond. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. 267 pp.

*Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion.* Edited by Jonas Wolff, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle. Routledge, 2014. 292 pp.

*Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes.* Edited by Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser. Cambridge University Press, 2014. 271 pp.

*Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits.* By Alexander Baturo. University of Michigan Press, 2014. 333 pp.

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*of Legitimacy and Development in Modern States.* By Hilton L. Root. The MIT Press, 2013. 332 pp.

*Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics.* By Rainer Forst. Polity, 2014. 216 pp.

*Local Leadership in Democratic Transition: Competing Paradigms in International Peacebuilding.* By Chavanne L. Peercy. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 225 pp.

*The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military Relations and the United Nations.* By Arturo C. Sotomayor. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. 255 pp.

*Political Creativity: Reconfiguring Institutional Order and Change.* Edited by Gerald Berk, Dennis C. Galvan, and Victoria Hattam. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 374 pp.

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*Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics.* By David Bosco. Oxford University Press, 2014. 297 pp.

*Social Movements in Global Politics.* By David West. Polity, 2013. 251 pp.

*A Theory of Militant Democracy: The Ethics of Combatting Political Extremism.* By Alexander S. Kirshner. Yale University Press, 2014. 208 pp.

*The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West.* By Ewan Harrison and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 265 pp.

# APSA-CD

is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the University of Florida's Department of Political Science and the International Forum.

The current issue of APSA-CD is available here. A complete archive of past issues is also available.

To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Staffan I. Lindberg, Benjamin Smith or Melissa Aten.

## Editorial Board Members

### Executive Editors



**Staffan I. Lindberg** is a professor of political science at the University of Gothenburg. He is also PI (with John Gerring and Michael Coppedge) the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project; and a research fellow at the Quality of Government Institute. His research focuses on state building, political clientelism, political parties, legislative-executive relations, women's representation, voting behavior, elections, and democracy in Africa. He is the author of *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) and the editor of *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition?* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

Europe. Among the issues that have figured prominently in his research agenda are the role of civil society in democratization, institutional choice in new democracies, the political economy of democratic survival, and the legacy of extreme forms of dictatorship.



**Petia Kostadinova** is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC). Dr. Kostadinova's main area of research involves the role of citizens' preferences, and media's transmission of these preferences, in shaping social and economic policies in the post-communist countries. A second stream of research focuses on the social and economic policies of the European Union. Prof. Kostadinova's research has been published in *Europe and National Economic Transformation: The EU After the Lisbon Decade*, Mitchell Smith, ed, the *European Journal of Communication*, the *Central European Journal of Communication*, and is forthcoming in *East European Politics and Journalism & Mass Communication*.



**Benjamin Smith** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research focuses on ethnic conflict, regime change, and the politics of resource wealth. His first book, *Hard Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, was published in 2007 by Cornell University Press, and his articles have appeared in *World Politics*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, the *Journal of International Affairs*, and other journals and edited volumes. Dr. Smith is currently working on a book exploring the long-term factors that shape the success of separatist movements.



**Bryon Moraski** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research considers the politics of institutional choice, institutional development, and the influence of short-term electoral incentives on long-term political trajectories. His first book, *Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia's Regions* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2006) explores the origins of Russia's sub-national legislative electoral systems. He has published numerous book chapters and articles, including works in *The American Journal of Political Science*, *Government and Opposition*, and the *Journal of Politics*. He is currently completing a co-authored book manuscript with William Reisinger (University of Iowa) that examines the links between federal elections and gubernatorial (s)election in Russia and their influence on the country's post-Soviet trajectory.

### Members



**Kate Baldwin** is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida. She studies state-building, clientelism, and the political economy of development with a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Her current research projects seek to understand the political consequences of involving non-state actors, such as traditional chiefs and non-governmental organizations, in the provision of goods and services.



**Michael H. Bernhard** is the inaugural holder of the Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Chair in Political Science at the University of Florida. His work centers on questions of democratization and development both globally and in the context of



**Conor O'Dwyer** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His book *Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development* examines the relationship

## Editorial Committee

between party-building and state-building in new democracies, looking specifically at the relationship between party competition and patronage politics in postcommunist Eastern Europe. His latest research examines the European Union's use of conditionality to promote more liberal minorities policies in postcommunist states. Specifically, it examines the EU's role in the contentious politics of homosexuality in postcommunist societies. Looking beyond just policy adoption, it examines the impact of EU-sponsored minority-rights policies: do they lead to shifts in attitudes regarding religious difference, national belonging, and minority rights?



**Philip Williams** is the director of the Center for Latin American Studies and a professor of political science and Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. He also co-directs the Latin American Immigrants in the New South project. His research interests include religion and politics, transnational migration, democratization, social movements, and civil-military relations. His latest book, *A Place to Be: Brazilian, Guatemalan, and Mexican Immigrants in Florida's New Destinations*, was published by Rutgers University Press in 2009 and his articles have appeared in numerous academic journals, including *Comparative Politics*, *Latin American Perspectives*, *Latin Studies*, and the *Journal of Latin American Studies*.



**Leonardo A. Villalón** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research has focused on Islam and politics and on democratization in West Africa, particularly Senegal, Mali, and Niger. He is the author of *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal* (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and co-editor of *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration* (Lynne Rienner, 1998) and *The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions* (Indiana University Press, 2005), as well as of numerous articles and book chapters on politics and religion in West Africa.

### Managing Editor

**Melissa Aten-Becnel** is the senior research and conferences officer at the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.

### Editorial Assistant



**Adam Bilinski** received a B.A. in International Relations at the University of Warsaw (Poland) and M.A. in Social Sciences from the University of Chicago. Currently he is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Florida with specialization in comparative politics. His research interests include the problems of survival of democracy, electoral revolutions and democracy promotion. He is currently working on his dissertation, which evaluates how pre-democratization historical legacies (in the form of pre-democratization regime discontinuities and regime type both in independent states and colonies) conditioned the probability of survival of once-established democracies.

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